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Ever since the Greek period, the whole Western philosophy has
made two really essential mistakes: they have believed in the exis-
tence of individuals and they have believed in their rationality. A
third mistake was added: the belief in reason as the authentic re-
flection of the absolute truth, the same as in their two biggest rea-
lizations: education and, mainly, science. It was believed that th-
rough education and science we would be able to master both phy-
sical nature and the social and moral one, in such a way that the
progress of science would mean, inevitably, a material, social and
moral progress. However, Nazism ruined all those beliefs all at on-
ce, because it sprung up exactly in one of the countries where Phi-
losophy, Education and Science were more advanced. And it hap-
pens when one comes to explain human behavior, emotion is mo-
re important than reason, and culture institutions and human
groups are more important than individuals. That is because the
human being is more relational than individualist, and more emo-
tional than rational. That is why the study of emotions provokes a
huge intrinsic interest. 
On the other hand, as Ortega y Gasset said ninety years ago, «in
the XV and XVI centuries, the man’s inside, the subjective world
and psychological issues were discovered. Opposed to the world
of fixed things, firmly settled in the space, the volatile world of
emotions appears, essentially turbulent, flowing in time» (Ortega
y Gasset, 1983, Vol I, p.488). It was not by chance that it was pre-
cisely at that time, exactly in 1538, when the Spaniard Juan Luis
Vives published the first known essay on passions or emotions (Vi-
ves, 1923). In fact, the third book of Tratado del alma is a com-
plete essay on emotions, (which Zajonc, 1998, did not even men-
tion), not excelled by the famous treaty written by Descartes, as
Vonilla de San Martín (1929,Vol.2, pp.240-241) pointed out. As
Carpintero (1994, p.32) wrote some years ago, there are interes-
ting similarities between these ideas and «Tratado de las Pasio-
nes», by Descartes, who mentioned Vives in some occasions; that
is why it has been suggested that «Tratado del Alma» could have
been a «source» of that Cartesian essay (Rodis-Lewis, 1948). For
Vives, the variety of affections is immense. «From there we get the
necessity of classifying them to be studied. We will not follow Vi-
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ves’ statement, but we will observe that in the developing, Vives’
classification is more complex than Descartes’. This is not so for
the basic principles, because it is well known that Descartes ad-
mitted six simple or primitive passions…, while Vives, with a bet-
ter philosophical criterion, accepted only two passions: love and
hate; that is, a movement of attraction towards goodness and anot-
her of repulsion towards evil. Following those preliminary consi-
derations, Vives began the exhibition of nature, characters and re-
lationships of the main affections, dealing successively with love,
desire, sympathy, respect, mercy, happiness, joy, pleasure, laugh -
ter, anger, disregard, wrath, hate, envy, jealousy, indignation, ven -
geance, cruelty, sadness, weeping, fear, hope, modesty and pride,
pointing out even the most subtle feature of each of them» (Boni-
lla de San Martín 1929, Vol.2, pp.240-241) (refer to Noreña, 1992,
for an interesting study on emotions by Vives).
It was not by chance that it was then, during the Renaissance,
when the novel appeared as a literary genre, because, as Ortega y
Gasset wrote at the beginning of the century, «the essential king-
dom of affections found, suddenly, its aesthetic expression: the no-
vel. The ultimate substance of the novel is the emotion: emotions
are there to reveal men’s passions, not in their plastic and active re-
alisations, not in their actions —the epic poem reveals those— but
in their spiritual origin, as contents flowing from the spirit. If the
novel describes the characters’ acts and even the landscape su-
rrounding them, it is only to explain and makes possible the direct
suggestion of affections, that are inside the soul» (Ortega y Gas-
set, 1983, Vol.I, p.488).
It was the appearance of subjectivity, hand in hand with the ap-
pearance of emotions, what made necessary the appearance of
psychology and social psychology, which, therefore, should turn
emotions into one of its main points of interest, something, which
did not happen at all. But on the contrary, emotions have been for-
gotten during a large part of «scientific psychology’s» history, alt-
hough there is no doubt we are witnessing the rebirth of this topic
during the last years. In fact, the issue of emotions, which had not
appeared in any of the previous three editions of the famous Hand -
book of Social Psychology, did appear in the fourth one (Gilbert
and cols., 1998), precisely in an essay by Zajonc (1998) that is, as
the rest of the Handbook, very traditional, forgetting the contribu-
tion of the socioconstructionist point of view, and not even men-
tioning neither Gergen nor Harré and their two famous books on
emotions (Harré, 1986; Harré and Parrot, 1996).
In sum, for the past years two opposite points of view have co-
existed when it comes to face emotions, the psychobiological ,
which aims to investigate the universal emotions and is based on
Darwin’s first studies (1872) and currently represented by authors
like Ekman or Izard; and the anthropological one, whose aim is
the opposite: the study of the emotional particularities according
to cultural differences, represented today mainly by authors such
as Kitayama, Markus or Mesquita. However, the polemic between
both points of view is not being fruitful mainly due to two reasons:
because each of them is firmly attached to their own position, wit-
hout any interest in moving a single inch, and, above all, because
while some are concentrated on the similarities among different
emotional manifestations, others are doing so precisely on the dif-
ferences. And, at least apparently, there is evidence to support both
positions (see Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). Moreover, and this is a
serious problem in this field of study, each one finds what they
want to, in such a way that while some see universality, others see
specificity. Therefore, a possible solution comes probably from the
consideration of emotions as a complex phenomena (Frijda, 1986;
Lazarus, 1991; Ortony and Turner, 1990), in a way that a compo-
nent, such as for instance, the physiological would be invariable
and, so, universal, while the other ones would be variable, adapta-
ble and, so, specific of the cultural situation.
On the other hand, the research body pretending to study emo-
tions cross-culturally, to find universals or to find intercultural dif-
ferences, presents some serious methodological problems, mainly
because, as Mesquita, Frijda and Scherer stated (1997), they com-
pare different countries simply, or more exactly, a specific group,
generally students, in a great urban centre (New York, Chicago,
etc), or, in the best cases, groups of students from different coun-
tries and supposedly different cultures. And I say pretendly be-
cause, in my opinion, aside from the gradual disappearance of cul-
tural differences, this erosion is more important among students,
especially if they are studying the same degrees, as is common in
this kind of research. So, I am convinced that there are less cultu-
ral differences between a student of Psychology from, for exam-
ple, Mexico, Santiago de Chile, Buenos Aires or New York, and a
second student of Psychology from Madrid (apparently all of them
belonging to different cultures), than between that student from
Madrid and a Spaniard shepherd from Las Hurdes (Extremadura)
or from Castilla (apparently belonging to the same Iberian cultu-
re). If we add the methodological problems inherent to the used
method (construction of scales, individuals’ willingness, problems
with the survey, etc), we will face a problematic situation and un-
reliable and doubtful data. Why then do we not leave the labora-
tory and go beyond closed empiricism of data and turn, for instan-
ce, to the study of emotions also in the literary genre (novels, au-
tobiographies, etc).
In any case, the cross-cultural study of emotions, being very in-
teresting in many aspects, presents many and very serious diffi-
culties due to other added reasons (Mesquita, Frijda & Scherer,
1997):
First, the different components of emotions are not indepen-
dent. Differences found to occur in one component probably tend
to bring along differences in other components, and thus may be
expected to have consequences for other components as well.
Second, emotions are multi-layered processes, among other re-
asons because the emotional response to an event is itself a signi-
ficant event to be appraised emotionally (Ellsworth, 1994; Fischer,
1991). Thus, the initial appraisal of the event may be modified by
a secondary appraisal focusing on the emotional response elicited
by the event. Cultural differences in the course of emotions may
thus be due to differences in secondary appraisal. There is eviden-
ce to suggest that cultures vary in their beliefs about which emo-
tions are most significant or revealing, which emotions are good or
bad, and which emotions are appropriate to particular social roles
or social settings (Ellsworth, 1994; Gerber, 1985; Markus y Kita-
yama, 1994; White, 1990, 1994).
Third, emotion as such, or the behaviors following from these
emotions, may affect the environment, thus changing the situation
in which the emotions were elicited in the first place. Emotions, in
other words, represent transactions with the environment (Lazarus,
1991). An appraisal of the situation as something which has been
modified may override or change the original appraisal.
Finally, the process character of emotions appears rather cle-
arly in that emotions have cognitive consequences such as belief
changes. These various cognitive consequences may well cause
cultural differences in emotional inclinations to be amplified.
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In fact, two of the main distinctions on which Western Psycho-
logy is based are first, the clear difference between individuals and
society, that is, the belief that individuals exist independent form
their social context (personality) and, secondly, a clear difference
between reason and emotion (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Kita-
yama and Markus, 1994). However, it does not seem that things
work like that in reality (Averill, 1985; Lutz, 1988,1996): there is
no separation whatever between the cognitive and the emotional
aspects, and there is no separation between both aspects and the
social and cultural ones. That is why there are so many variations
in the emotional vocabulary depending on the cultures (Heelas,
1986,1996; Rusell, 1991).
«In short, there is a substantial body of cross-cultural evidence
which throws doubt on the universal validity of many of the cate-
gories with which the discipline of Psychology has been operating.
Contrary to common belief, these categories do not occupy some
rarefied place above culture but are embedded in a particular pro-
fessional sub-culture. There myriad alternative ways of speaking
about individual action and experience, the language of twentieth-
century American Psychology accurately reflects the natural and
universal structure of the phenomena we call “psychological”. If
such arrogance is to be avoided, a closer examination of this lan-
guage has to be undertaken» (Danzinger, 1997, p. 5). It is neces-
sary to avoid such arrogance and analyze that psychological lan-
guage, even though it is a very difficult task, if not impossible, gi-
ven the difficulty of defining what is really the psychological part:
How to distinguish the psychological language from other langua-
ges, and how to differentiate one psychological category from
another?. In any case, it is necessary to focus on the conception
that we, Western people, have about what is the psychological as-
pect, which is no more than the categories used by the so-called
«scientific psychology», that is, both through the academic psy-
chology and through the professional one (intelligence, motiva-
tion, attitudes, emotions, etc). Categories which, on the other hand,
have their roots, the same as the whole Western philosophy, in
Classical Greece, particularly in Aristotle, although it was during
the XVIII century that some of them, such as emotions, acquired
their current meaning (Danziger, 1997, Cap.3). «They are the pro-
ducts of a historical process of reconstructing human subjectivity
in psychological terms, a process that was particularly in evidence
in certain parts of post-medieval Europe. Without this develop-
ment there could be no modern discipline of Psychology. The sub-
ject matter of that discipline depends on a culturally embedded
tendency to experience much of human life in psychological
terms» (Danzinger, 1997, p. 16)1. Subsequently, those objectives
were turning into the target of both investigation and intervention
of psychology as a discipline, a practice that, effectively, rebuilt
them particularly in the United States of America and, through
their influence, at least in the whole Western world. «The thirty-
year period, approximately defined by the dates 1910 and 1940,
was a time of revolutionary change. It was revolutionary, not be-
cause the phenomena themselves changed. They changed because
the categories that defined them changed» (Danzinger, 1997, p.
19). And as Gergen wrote (1992, p.285), we often talk about our
thoughts and purposes, feelings and hopes, dreams and fears, de-
sires, beliefs and values, and without those terms we would not be
able to advance in our private or institutional life. A love affair,
would not be such a love affair if we did not have a language to la-
bel our emotions. A criminal offence could not be judged without
a speech related to the purposes of those involved in it; and if so-
me religious institutions were deprived of the concept of soul, they
would collapse. And it happens that although such categories
(emotion, motivation, intelligence, etc) have been built by the
community during centuries, psychologists contribute in an im-
portant manner to provide them with a specifically psychological
meaning and, through their empirical studies, give them the appe-
arance of having an empirical nature, that is, give the appearance
they really represent an important part of reality. But, nevertheless,
it is completely impossible to understand the meaning of those
terms, apart from their historic and cultural meaning. And this is
more important given the already endemic ahistoricism of Western
psychology, resulting from the mistaken decision that was made
when it was included among the natural sciences: if psychology is
a natural science, it cannot be historical and it will have to study
its objects (emotion, cognition, motivation, etc.) as historically in-
variable phenomena.
And, however, psychology, and even more social psychology,
should be located historically and culturally in the place were they
belong. That is, psychology and social psychology are eminently
historical and cultural disciplines because the phenomena under
their study, including, obviously, emotions, are historical and cul-
tural. That is why the integration of those traditional points of view
we have mentioned, the biological and the anthropological, has be-
en difficult, not to say openly impossible, if the cultural and histo-
rical influence on the development of the biological and the phy-
siological human being had not been included. And it has been im-
possible to integrate both points of view because of the represen-
tation and concept the experts have not only about emotions but al-
so about life and human being and its process of formation. For
instance, a positivist and empiricist, who possesses a naive rea-
lism, could never reach an agreement on this topic, or any other,
with a socioconstructionist antipositivist who defends an antirea-
list and relativist position. Here, we find one of the most important
nucleus of the polemic in the study of emotions. For instance, even
when basic emotions are studied, results will be necessarily diffe-
rent when the advocated position is that language is the mirror of
reality, external to language and individual, and when it is stressed
that language does not reflect reality, but constructs it (Harré, Ger-
gen, etc), or when the human being is thought of as an eminently
biological being, or is seen as an eminently sociocultural and his-
torical being. Consequently, I will leave aside in this essay the bio-
logical and neo-darwinist theories on emotions, the same as the so-
ciological ones and I will focus only on two main aspects of this
complex topic: the sociocultural context of emotions, on the one
hand, and above all, the social construction of emotions, on the
other.
Emotions and sociocultural context
Efforts to construct a sociocultural psychology are not new, but
it has been precisely during the 90’s when their intensity grew. It
is known that there are important differences among people from
different cultures both in their cognitive function and in the moti-
vational and interpersonal one (see Markus, Kitayama & Heiman,
1996; Markus and Kitayama, 1998; Fiske and cols., 1998). Just to
give a few examples, comparing people from Western cultures, ba-
sically European and North American ones, to people from Eas-
tern cultures (Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Indian or Arabs), many
important differences have been observed, some of them referring
to the motivational-emotional field. Thus, while Western people
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show a strong personal tendency towards optimism, self-praise, or
to have illusions of particularity, searching for the sources of it
(Harter, 1990; James, 1890; Lau, 1984), Eastern people show very
different trends (tendency towards pessimism, modesty and a wish
to be ordinary or normal, and a tendency towards experiencing
themselves as similar to the rest, not being better than others but
interdependent of the rest) (Heine and Lehman, 1995; Markus and
Kitayama, 1991b). In a similar way, in Western cultures self de-
termination and freedom to choose is the most powerful behavior
impulse (Deci and Ryan, 1990), while in Eastern cultures it is ot-
hers’ expectations: they are constantly receptive and responding to
others, to their wishes and needs (Bond, 1986; Miller, Fung and
Mintz, 1996; Sheti and Lepper, 1995). Cultural differences in this
field can be important up to such a level that, as Harré and his co-
lleagues wrote (1989, p.19), it is even possible that different cul-
tures, when they underline an emotion more than others, could cre-
ate people whose physiological systems could be different from
each other. Some civilizations foster fear to danger, while others
try to avoid it. This can be applied especially to human anatomy,
diet and exercise could provoke very different physical appearan-
ces in people from the same origin because of different cultural
conventions.
More exactly, as Church and Lonner (1998) stated, the most re-
levant cross-cultural studies on emotion from a personality analy-
ses use to deal mainly with these two topics: 1) Do people go th-
rough the same emotions in all the cultures?, and, 2) Are there any
differences in the frequency, intensity, etc, in the way those emo-
tions are experienced or expressed by individuals from different
cultures? If biological theories on emotion (Izard,1994) predict an
important universality in the experienced emotions, at least in the
most basic ones (joy, fear, anger, etc.), less universality is percei -
ved by the socioconstructionist theories (Harré, 1986; Harré and
Parrot, 1996; Wierzbicka,1992). In any case, the cross-cultural
acknowledgement studies on the expression of emotions provide a
clear evidence of the universal emotions (Ekman, 1994; Izard,
1994), although that evidence has begun to be under debate re-
cently (Carroll and Russell, 1996; Russell, 1994,1995), apart from
the little clarity as regards to its meaning.
In short, although available information is not enough and even
when there are some relatively inconsistent data, we do have some
clear conclusions. For instance, in more collective cultures, indivi-
duals feel and express emotions towards others (sympathy, em-
pathy), more than those from individualist cultures who, on the
contrary, feel and express emotions towards themselves (anger,
pride, etc.) (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, 1994; Triandis,
1995). In the same way, in the Western world, it is usually belie-
ved that people’s behaviour tends to be consistent through diffe-
rent situations, because that behaviour depends more on the peo-
ple’s features than on the characteristics of the situation. That is,
there is a trend to believe in personality. And this belief is here so
strong that when the behaviour changes with the situation it is at-
tributed to cynicism, hypocrisy or to some psychological patho-
logy. Those beliefs have conditioned Western studies in this field
completely, at the same time that such studies have reinforced such
beliefs in a great manner.
Nevertheless, the cultural psychology of personality shows that
it is not like that, on the contrary, in the first place behaviour de-
pends on the situation, and in second place, that situational varia-
tions depend on cultural facts to a great extent (see Markus & Ki-
tayama, 1998). What is more, cultural or sociocultural psychology
(see Wertsch, del Río & Alvarez; 1999) admits not that psycholo-
gical processes (personality, emotions, motivation, intelligence,
etc.) are influenced by culture, but that they are constructed by cul-
ture, and at the same time that it is personality and its behaviour
which create the culture. That is why it is impossible to study both
things separately: personality and culture, or emotion and culture,
should be studied together as a dynamic of mutual constitution
(Kitayama & cols.,1997): we cannot study emotions separate from
the culture in which they have been created and where they are ex-
pressed. And it happens that the individual level is not previous or
posterior to the cultural level: they both go together and they cre-
ate each other at the same time. So, sometimes it is fiercely argued
if the human being is more animal or cultural, often concluding
that human beings are both things, with different percentages de-
pending on the authors. For instance, some say that we are above
all social and cultural beings, not forgetting that we are also ani-
mals, for instance a 75% and a 25% respectively. And it is not li-
ke that! We are a 100% animal and also a 100% social and cultu-
ral. We do not have anything that is not proper of animals (ob-
viously, of that animal species known as human species), which
coincides more or less with the characteristics shown by other ani-
mal species. But we do not have anything that is not social and cul-
tural either. Because our entire animal features (even those which
are considered by some as exclusively animal, such as the need for
being fed, the aggressive behaviour of attack and the defense, or
the sexual behaviour) are socialized and educated. And not even
one of them is not like that. Even more, if that is possible, an emo-
tion, which is completely interdependent of the meaning and the
practices of the particular sociocultural contexts. Although the
physical or physiological aspects of emotion have been the focus
of the traditional studies on emotion, however the need for taking
into account the cognitive and linguistic components of emotion,
the same as the social, cultural and historical ones has steadily be-
en acknowledged. However, as Parrot and Harré (1996) have sta-
ted, if the traditional view forgot the social and cultural aspects,
now we cannot do the same, forgetting the somatic and biological
aspects of emotions, something that would be really grievous gi-
ven its importance for the nature of emotions and for the human
emotional life. The biological aspects are basic when it comes to
emotion, but we need to reinterpret the relation between body and
emotion. A reinterpretation that points clearly to the social cos-
tructionism which grants an important role to culture and sociali-
zation when it comes to being an influence on the structure and on
the neurological and physiological function. That is, as pointed out
by Averill (1996), the neurophysiological is a fundamental com-
ponent of emotions, but it has to be understood in a way quite dif-
ferent from the traditional one. The neurophysiological aspects are
not in any way independent from the social and cultural ones.
Nevertheless, in Western countries, the generalized belief in the
human being as an independent individual, turned to himself, se-
parated from the rest, with whom he/she could have (not necessa-
rily) relationships, is an idea that comes partly from the Greeks,
was reinforced during the Renaissance and acquired authentic na-
ture during the Enlightenment, mainly through Kant and through
the relevance it gave to individual reason and to free will. Moreo-
ver, this view was even more reinforced during the Industrial Re-
volution and Capitalism. That is why individualism is a basic ele-
ment for Western society (Guisinger & Blatt, 1994; Triandis and
cols., 1988), and the psychological study of a person in the Wes-
tern social science is deeply rooted in the ontology of individua-
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lism (Greenfield, 1994; Ho,1993; Markus and cols., 1996; Samp-
son, 1988). However, in the East (China, India, Japan, Korea, etc.)
those things are considered in a very different way. Here, a person
is regarded as someone completely interdependent, someone who
takes part in the social relationships that surround him/her, and be-
haviour is not something that comes from within, that has its sour-
ce in the individual’s inside, but something that responds to others,
that therefore, has its source in the outside, in the social world.
Thus, neither emotions, nor personality or any other psychological
phenomenon have a meaning when they are separated from the so-
cial and cultural context (see Church & Lonner, 1998; Fiske &
cols., 1998; Kitayama, 1997; Kitayama & cols., 1997; Markus &
Kitayama, 1997, 1998; Piker, 1994, 1998, etc.): because the social
and cultural context does not go with them, but constructs them.
On the other hand, the question of what is a person is, is quite
fundamental, because the answer we give can influence our lives,
our feelings regarding ourselves, our emotions and our behaviour.
Cultural and social practices, educational ones among them, will
differ in a great manner according to the answer we give to the
abovementioned question (Markus, Mullalley & Kitayama, 1997).
In that sense we could say, legitimately, that one’s own personality
is a social and cultural construction, a collective construction.
From this we may extract the huge differences between Western
and Eastern personality (Fiske & cols., 1998; Kitayama & cols,
1997; Markus, Mullalley & Kitayama, 1997). For instance, while
self-criticism is something seldom found, and even unbelievable in
certain situations in Western countries, it is something very com-
mon and spontaneous in Asia. As Markus and Kitayama write
(1998, p.74) «perhaps less obvious, but crucial from a cultural psy-
chological perspectives, is the fact that a unique, independent in-
dividual and the attendant system of personality that is autono-
mous, stable, and entity-like, are also socially and collectively
constructed and maintained». For example, children are treated
and tought like independent human beings, they are reclaimed per-
sonal and individual responsability for all their acts, they are dres-
sed in a «personal» manner, they are put in individual and inde-
pendent rooms, etc. «In short, both the independent model of the
person in the West and the interdependent model of the person in
Asia are likely to participate in the “real” making of the person and
thus constitute the respective personalities. This cultural psycho-
logical analysis suggest, then, that if models of personalities are
different and if they are differently implicated in everyday func-
tioning of both cultures, then actual personalities, namely, modes
of on-line functioning of each person, are also likely to be very dif-
ferent» (Markus & Kitayama, 1998, p. 75).
Social construction of emotions
As we have already mentioned, although emotions are influen-
ced by biological processes and mechanisms, they can also be use-
fully conceptualized as social constructions. The socioconstructio-
nist perspective on emotion has been highly developed by cultural
anthropologists like Rosaldo (1984), Lutz (1988), White (1993)
and Shweder (1993). «Exactly what is meant by the social cons-
tructionist view varies among theorists. But what is common here
is an emphasis on the constitutive role of cultural practices, inter-
personal communications, and tacit cultural knowledge in emotio-
nal responses. A person’s emotional responses are densely contin-
gent on these practices and meanings. Although emotion is ob-
viously grounded in bodily sensations, these sensations themsel-
ves may be formed through cultural practices and meanings of the
self and its relationship with the surroundings» (Markus, Kitaya-
ma and Heiman, 1996, p. 889). From this point of view, the emo-
tional experience is social and cultural above all (Kitayama &
Markus, 1994).
We have also mentioned that there are basically two types of
theories about the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The first ones
consider the self as being autonomous and independent, while the
second ones consider it as part of the group and depending on the
rest and on its relations with them. Thus, there are many emotions
that depend in a great manner on how the self is considered and ex-
perienced (anger, frustration, pride, shame, remorse, etc.), which
means that, undoubtedly, they depend not only on the cultural con-
text but also that it is which constitutes them (see Crespo, 1986).
Another example of how emotions are socially constructed is
grief (being sad). Frequently people believe that pain or mourning
is a basic reaction against the loss of something dear, something
that happens not only to human beings, but also to some animals,
like dogs. But, we have to say that such emotion varies strongly
from one culture to another. Some civilizations react against loss
not with pain, but with anger, seeking of vengeance or revenge,
while others, as people from Tahiti, limit the reactions against any
kind of loss: grief is not clearly recognized. On the contrary, the
Ifaluk try to decrease that pain while they are proud of their sym-
pathy towards those who have lost someone dear (Stearns, 1993).
However, it is not only grief which is different from one cultu-
re to another. There are also important historical changes. Thus, in
the Western culture, pain was given a huge importance since the
first years of the XIX century (Lofland, 1985). For example pa-
rents felt pain when a little child died. But there were three ele-
ments that constrained the open manifestation of their pain and
even, possibly, pain itself (Stearn & Knapp, 1996, p.133): First,
undue grief could undue attachment to worldly ties, rather than ap-
propriately focus on God’s majesty. Neither Protestant nor Catho-
lic Christianity encouraged grief. Children were taught to react to
death more with fear than with indulgent grief, at least in Calvi-
nism; death of others was an object lesson in how quickly one
could be snatched away to face God’s judgment (Fiore, 1992). Se-
cond, emotional ties within families were usually somewhat mu-
ted. Marriages were not formed primarily on the basis of emotio-
nal attraction, nor were intense bonds emphasized between parents
and children. The overriding economic concerns of families could
cushion the shock of death, which however regrettable was vital in
order to keep family size in manageable bounds. Even spousal de-
ath could seem somewhat routine. Evidence of husbands’ reac-
tions to maternal mortality in the eighteenth-century South, for
example, suggests what to modern ears would seem a shocking ca-
llousness (Lockridge and Lewis, 1988). Deaths of older parents
could be positively welcome, particularly where land was in short
supply, because they alone permitted attainment of full economic
adulthood, through inheritance. And finally, the nature of death it-
self provided the third cushion against great grief. The act of dying
appropriately, in the home, without great pain, seems to have allo-
wed many people to adjust to the prospect of loss such that tre-
mendous outpourings of grief were not necessary. Today, on the
other hand, grief can be, on the whole, bigger, because there are
more people dying away from their home (at hospital, on the road,
etc.), or dying suddenly, mainly due to car-crashes.
Everything that had been said started to change during the first
years of the XIX century creating what sociologists called the arri-
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val of the modern reactions against grief (Lofland, 1985; Rosen-
blatt, 1983; Wells, 1994). And that was mainly connected to those
two changes that took place in the Victorian age. First, love acqui-
res a great importance amongst middle class families (Lystra,
1989): the love between a couple and the love towards children,
mainly towards the youngest ones, increased mainly because of
the reduction in birth rate. Secondly, with the growing deep belief
in progress, a belief that derives from the Enlightenment, it is
thought that many deaths are completely improper of the XIX cen-
tury, mostly the death of children. Popular magazines for women
bomb the readers with messages saying that if certain parental
educational practices were left aside death among children would
disappear. That brought about a growing feeling of guilt when the-
re was a death in the family, mainly of a young member, and the
subsequent increase of grief. «Cultural change, in sum, more than
any concrete functional shift, lay behind the burgeoning attention
to grief in nineteenth-century middle-class culture» (Stearns &
Knapp, 1996, p. 134). Therefore, as Stearns and Knapp concluded
(1996, p.149), «grasp of the modern history of grief, and its unex-
pected though understandable complexity, is an essential step in
understanding the emotion itself. Grief is not pure response; it is
conditioned by its dependence on an evolving cultural context,
highly sensitive to functional and larger cultural issues». That is
why, given the deep cultural changes produced along the last 150
years, emotion has also gone through important changes during
that period, because, on the whole, the same as other emotions
«grief reactions are, in sum, to some extent at least culturally cons-
tructed» (Ariès & Duby, 1991).
As we see, it is not the tre atment of the topic of emotions that
ch a ra c t e ri zes the new social psych o l ogy, something wh i ch is not
n ew at all (in fact, it was dealt with by Ari s t o t l e, Saint Thomas, Vi-
ves, Descartes, etc.), but the way of tre ating them: the new social
p s y ch o l ogy considers that emotions, as other psychosocial pheno-
mena, are essentially s o c i a l ly c o n s t ru c t e d. Let us analy ze a curi o u s
phenomenon that seems to confi rm wh at I have just said. We «fe-
el» emotions phy s i c a l ly, that is, phy s i o l ogi c a l ly, in one or another
o rgan, but with huge cultural diffe rences: in some cultures they «fe-
el» love in the heart; in others they feel it in the live r, the back, etc.
And this is because our organs are educated and psych o l ogi ze d.
Th e re fo re, for We s t e rn Europeans today it is in the heart wh e re
emotions lie (especially those such as love). And, in fact, we belie-
ve that we «feel those emotions phy s i c a l ly in our heart». But peo-
ple from other cultures believe they feel emotions in other orga n s .
For instance, Tahitians feel them in their guts (Lev y, 1973, p.515).
Gahuku-Gama feel them in their stomachs (Read, 1967, p. 214),
e t c. In conclusion, emotions are social and cultural constru c t i o n s
f rom diffe rent points of view (Heelas, 1996): the phy s i o l ogical, so-
cial and cultural elements of emotions cannot be sep a rat e d, alt-
hough there is a clear pri m a cy of the sociocultural element. Let us
t a ke up an example from Gergen (1992, p.30): the Ilongot tribe in
N o rth Philippines believe that one of the basic elements of a man’s
p s y che is a state they call l i ge t. As described by the anthro p o l ogi s t
M i chelle Rosaldo (1980), it would be more or less equivalent to the
t e rms we use to re fer to «energy», «anger» and «passion». Howe-
ve r, that state cannot be identified with any of the terms we use and
it does not respond to a possible combination among them neither.
L i ge t is a masculine fe at u re, whose ex p ressions we cannot eve n
i m agi n e. When possessed by l i ge t, a young Ilongot can bu rst into
t e a rs, start singing or ex p ress his bad temper. He may refuse cert a i n
fo o d, start stabbing baskets, shout furi o u s ly, spill water or ex p re s s
his anger or confusion in a thousand diffe rent ways. And when l i -
ge t re a ches its climax, he will feel himself fo rced to cut off the he-
ad of a member of a neighboring tri b e. Once he has done all those
things, he will feel that his l i ge t has ch a n ged and that he is able to
ch a n ge others. His energy is incre a s e d, he has sexual desires and he
a c q u i res a pro found feeling of his know l e d ge. It is difficult to ima-
gine that l i ge t is a basic element in the biological constitution, that
is waiting somehow in our inside, it searches to be ex p ressed and
remains inhibited under the art i ficial laye rs of civ i l i z ation. Thus, l i -
ge t, as Gergen points out (1992, p.30), is a construction common to
the Ilongot culture, in the same way the feelings of anguish, env y
or romantic love are a construction common to our culture.
A second example, also taken from Gergen (1992), is mater-
nity. In modern times, we consider that a mother’s love towards
her children represents a basic aspect of human nature: it would be
an emotion with a genetic basis. If a mother does not show her lo-
ve towards her children (for example, if she leaves or sell them),
we would think that she is completely inhuman, although we con-
sider less inhuman the father who leaves his wife and children. But
this has not always been the same, as the historian Elizabeth Ba-
dinter (1981) points out, during the XVII and XVIII centuries, in
France and England, children lived as outsiders. The writings from
those periods show a clear antipathy towards them. Among poor
people, those who neither underwent abortions nor had an easy ac-
cess to birth control, leaving children was a widely practiced cus-
tom. Clearly, the concept of «maternal instinct» would have been
strange for those societies. Moreover, as Gergen adds (1992), even
lactation was seen as a waste of time for the mother in some cir-
cles. If a family was rich enough, the baby was sent to the country
most of the times to be taken care of by a wet nurse; and due to the
ill-treatment children received from those wet nurses, and to the
scarce milk they were given, it was very common that those chil-
dren died. Those deaths were considered as routine matters, be-
cause in the short, or in the long, run a child was substituted by
another one; the private diaries, when relating family customs,
show that the death of a child provoked the same reaction in the fa-
mily as in the neighbors, or even less; even the everyday economic
activities of a family took up more time (Áries & Duby, 1991). Ba-
dinter quotes Montaigne: «Two out of my three children died whi-
le they were with their wet nurses; I will not say that their death
did not provoke a great pain on me, but none of them made me fe-
el a great sorrow». Badinter’s conclusion is that the concept of an
instinctive maternal love is a product of the recent evolution in the
West, that is, it is a social and cultural construction.
The current conception of emotions, the same as the language
and the vocabulary that describes them is a product of the roman-
tic period, as is the case, for instance, of grief, which we have al-
ready mentioned. As Rosenblatt writes (1983), given that indivi-
duals were able to experience a profound love, the loss of someo-
ne dear, provoked an immense pain, and a huge value was given to
its expression because it allowed the man’s inside to speak, and
that was enriching. The private diaries from those ages reveal a
strong tendency to preserve unchanged and omnipresent the ima-
ge of the dead person, and to communicate with him/her through
prayers or spiritualist sessions.
Conclusions
As stated by Parrott and Harré (1996, p.1), emotions have a
special fascination, because they not only constitute the basic cha-
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racteristics of human life, but also show the ways in which current
psychology faces an irreducible flexibility. In fact, emotions are at
the same time somatic, cognitive, social and cultural. There is also
a great variability and variation among them: while some seem to
be general features of the human etology, established after many
generations of Darwinian selection; others are acquired as pure ha-
bits and, finally others have been learned in the same way that ma-
nual skills are learned. But all of them can be easily influenced by
the cultural context and they acquire their real meaning in inter-
personal situations, up to the point of being socially constructed
(Harré, 1986).
However, the Western tradition is deeply similar to a view of
the self as an independent unity. While this view is supported, the
traditional problems of epistemology and the social knowledge
will be unsolved (and insoluble), and the numerous social practi-
ces where this conception is found, will not be answered. And that
is what happened with the topic of emotions, which have been
erroneously considered in the Western culture. And I say errone-
ously because, as Gergen states (1996), the vocabulary of emo-
tions (together with its similar realizations) is tied to the creation
or erosion of history. In fact, we do not talk any more about our
melancholy or apathy, as reasons that excuse us from work and so-
cial obligations, although we could have done that in the XVII
century. We improvise without any effort about our depression,
anguish, about how sick we are of our job, and of our stress; none
of those terms would have had a significant importance even one
century ago. That kind of sociohistoric variations are difficult to be
adjusted according to the individualist presuppositions of univer-
sal and biologically fixed tendencies: thus, emotions are sociohis-
torical constructions.
On the other hand, emotions have a clearly gradual nature,
where not only the feelings and affections take part in an interac-
tive and dialectic play, but also the cognition’s, motivations, beha-
viours and environmental variables. And something so complex
will clearly resist being studied in simple ways, purely quantitati-
ve, and measured through simple surveys with fixed answers. Con-
sequently, as Mesquita, Frijda and Scherer (1997) concluded in
their work, there are strong reasons to assume that cultural diffe-
rences in emotions will be more pronounced (a) when the different
components of emotion are studied in their temporal and functio-
nal relation; (b) when attention is focused on the way the meaning
and social effects of emotions feed back into the emotion process;
and (c) when the focus of research is shifted from individual emo-
tions to emotion ecologies, and factors that influence cultural dif-
ferences in emotion ecologies.
Therefore, emotions are, without any doubt, socially construc-
ted but we cannot forget that they are also socially constitutive:
«Emotion is socially constituted but it is also socially constituent:
the type of civilization we are depends in a significant level on the
type of emotions we consider and value» (Landman, 1996; p.112).
In sum, emotions are not as strange as has been believed, neit-
her to the cultural context nor to the interpersonal context, or even
to the responsibility and the will of the individual. This is once
more proof that, as stated by Luria, human psychology is a com-
plex model of cultural practices, discursive conventions and phy-
siological processes, where none of them is a priority because each
of them interact with the rest conforming them. None of those th-
ree components has an isolated meaning, separate from the other
two elements, something that if true for general psychology, is es-
pecially important in the case of the psychology of emotions,
which, subsequently, is forced to be the social psychology of emo -
tions.
Nota
1 See Graham Richards (1987, 1989, 1992) for the process ne-
cessary for the development of a language allowing specifically
psychological objects.
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